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Abstract
The hypothesis that anatomically modern homo sapiens could have undergone changes akin to those
observed in domesticated animals has been contemplated in the biological sciences for at least 150
years. The idea had already plagued philosophers such as Rousseau, who considered the civilisation
of man as going against human nature, and eventually "sparked over" to the medical sciences in the
late 19th and early 20th century. At that time, human "self-domestication" appealed to psychiatry,
because it served as a causal explanation for the alleged degeneration of the "erbgut" (genetic
material) of entire populations and the presumed increase of mental disorders.
Consequently, Social Darwinists emphasised preventing procreation by people of "lower genetic
value" and positively selecting favourable traits in others. Both tendencies culminated in euthanasia
and breeding programs ("Lebensborn") during the Nazi regime in Germany. Whether or not
domestication actually plays a role in some anatomical changes since the late Pleistocene period is,
from a biological standpoint, contentious, and the currently resurrected debate depends, in part,
on the definitional criteria applied.
However, the example of human self-domestication may illustrate that scientific ideas, especially
when dealing with human biology, are prone to misuse, particularly if "is" is confused with "ought",
i.e., if moral principles are deduced from biological facts. Although such naturalistic fallacies appear
to be banned, modern genetics may, at least in theory, pose similar ethical problems to medicine,
including psychiatry. In times during which studies into the genetics of psychiatric disorders are
scientifically more valued than studies into environmental causation of disorders (which is currently
the case), the prospects of genetic therapy may be tempting to alter the human genome in patients,
probably at costs that no-one can foresee.
In the case of "self-domestication", it is proposed that human characteristics resembling
domesticated traits in animals should be labelled "domestication-like", or better, objectively
described as genuine adaptations to sedentism.
Introduction
The term "domestication" refers to a goal-directed process
through which humans have changed physical features of
plants and animals by replacing natural through artificial
selection to adapt these species to specific human needs.
In animals, domestication-associated changes also
include behavioural characteristics, which, above all, have
led to a reduction of aggression and an increase of "tame-
ness" [1]. At least since Darwin's pioneering work on
domestication [2], biologists have controversially debated
whether several aspects of domestication-induced traits in
animals could similarly be present in humans, and this
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issue has recently been reconsidered [1,3]. Even earlier,
however, philosophers have been plagued with the ques-
tion of man's place in nature. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1755), for instance, had argued that "civilised" living
conditions would have negative consequences, subsumed
under the term "degeneration" [4]. Conversely, in the
1940s, the German philosopher Arnold Gehlen proposed
a self-domestication theory of homo sapiens, according to
which domestication would, on one hand, induce biolog-
ical maladaptedness through abandoning natural selec-
tion, but, on the other hand, open new prospects for
cultural development [5]. Similarly, recent humanism has
highlighted the positive aspects of a presumed human
domestication such as to prevent "brutalisation" of
human societies (comment in [6]).
Whereas philosophers have extensively discussed putative
effects of human self-domestication in terms of moral val-
ues, by the turn of the 20th century psychiatrists became
interested in the hypothesis of human self-domestication,
because it seemingly provided a causal explanation for
what was perceived as signs of degeneration of the human
genepool ("erbgut") [7]. In 1857, the French psychiatrist
Benedicte Morel sought to introduce objective measures
in support of the concept of "degeneration", suggesting
that subtle physical abnormalities would indicate the
deterioration of mental health and also account for delin-
quent behaviour, because such deviations would be most
prevalent in mentally ill and criminals [8]. Indeed, by the
turn of the 20th century, with increasing biologising of
psychiatry, leading professionals were concerned about
the seemingly rising number of hospitalised patients and
searched for biological explanations, leaving aside social
factors [9]. Hence, the hypothesis of the domestication of
man was welcome, and, in light of the then prevailing cul-
tural pessimism and upcoming eugenic idealism put forth
by August Forel and Alfred Ploetz [10], readily adopted as
rationalisation of a host of unresolved questions in psy-
chiatry and related social issues. It is perhaps not exagger-
ated to state that this one-sided biological view of mental
disorders and handicaps also contributed to what fol-
lowed in Germany under the Nazi regime.
Albeit modern human biology may be largely free of
moral allegations, there seems to be a need for discussing
the possible impact of biological findings and hypotheses
on contemporary conceptualisations of mental health
and treatment options of psychiatric disorders. This
premise is based on the fact that biological ideas have
always been at risk of socio-political misuse, and on the
concern that the advent of new genetic techniques may be
tempting to "improve" human genetic material and elim-
inate unwanted traits, part of which could erroneously be
attributed to human self-domestication.
In this article, I shall (1) deal with the biological evidence
for human self-domestication and the historical develop-
ment of the idea, including its entanglement with political
opportunism during the Nazi epoch in Germany; (2) out-
line how and why the self-domestication hypothesis was
adopted by leading (German) psychiatrists, and possibly
contributed to positive and negative selection programs
during the Third Reich in Germany; (3) finally argue that
the debate between philosophy, biology, and other medi-
cal sciences including psychiatry necessitates a common
language for further interdisciplinary exchange of ideas, as
well as awareness of the dangers of naturalistic fallacies.
Human self-domestication – the development of 
an idea
Charles Darwin was the first to systematically examine
biological changes in species under artificial breeding
conditions. Even though he did not refer to the question
of human self-domestication in his two volumes on Vari-
ations of Animals and Plants under Domestication [2], Dar-
win proposed clear definitional criteria for the process of
domestication. He emphasised (1) that the domestication
of animals is more than taming, (2) that it represents a
goal-oriented process for human purposes, (3) that the
variability of physical and 'mental' characteristics is
greater in domesticated species than in their wild ances-
tors, including the occurrence of dwarfism and gigantism,
(4) that the behavioural plasticity and educability of
domesticated species is greater, and (5) that the brain size
of domesticated animals is smaller than that of their wild
ancestors'.
In spite of these unequivocal definitional criteria, Darwin
was remarkably vague regarding the possibility that
humans could have undergone domestication. In The
Decent of Man [11], he wrote the following (the most crit-
ical phrases are highlighted in italics by the author): "It is,
nevertheless, an error to speak of man, even if we look
only to the conditions to which he has been exposed, as
'far more domesticated' (Blumenbach 1865) than any
other animal. ... In another and much more important
respect, man differs widely from any strictly domesticated
animal; for his breeding has never long been controlled, either
by methodical or unconscious selection. No race or body
of men has been so completely subjugated by other men,
as that certain individuals should be preserved, and thus
unconsciously selected, from somehow excelling in utility
to their masters. Nor have certain male and female individu-
als been intentionally picked out and matched, except in the
well known case of the Prussian grenadiers;" (p. 29) ... By
contrast, in another paragraph Darwin stated: "We might,
therefore, expect that civilized men, who in one sense are
highly domesticated, would be more prolific than wild
men. It is also probable that the increased fertility of civi-
lised nations would become, as with our domestic ani-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:21 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/21
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mals, an inherited character ..." (p. 45–46). With respect
to brain size Darwin argued, however, that in contrast to
domesticated animals the human brain and skull has
increased  over time. Nevertheless, in the chapter on
human races, Darwin reiterates that "man in many
respects may be compared with those animals which have
long been domesticated, ..." (p. 178); and later: "With
man no such question can arise, for he cannot be said to
have been domesticated at any particular period" (p.
183). And finally: "With our domestic animals a new race
can readily be formed by carefully matching the varying
offspring from a single pair, or even from a single individ-
ual possessing some new character; but most of our races
have been formed, not intentionally from selected pair, but
unconsciously by the preservation of many individuals which
have varied, however slightly, in some useful or desired
manner" (p. 188). In summary, although Darwin did not
hold a clear position concerning the possibility that
domestication could have taken place in homo sapiens, he
pointed to the fact that no scientific proof in favour of
such a hypothesis existed, particularly, due to a lack of
goal-directedness or conscious selection of traits. How-
ever, he also made clear that humans might share some
characteristics typical of domesticated animals such as
increased fertility.
In the biological literature following Darwin, the term
"domestication" became increasingly poorly defined. The
criterion of intentional and goal-directed selection, which
according to Darwin's definition was critical for domesti-
cation, was largely replaced, at least with respect to
humans, by the equation of culture and civilisation with
domestication.
An extensive evaluation of the topic was put forward by
Eugen Fischer in his essay on Die Rassenmerkmale des Men-
schen als Domestikationserscheinungen ("The racial charac-
teristics of man as a result of domestication", 1914) [12].
A couple of years later, Fischer became known for his pub-
lication of Grundriß der menschlichen Erblichkeitslehre und
Rassenhygiene  ("Outline of human genetics and racial
hygiene"), which he edited together with Erwin Baur and
Fritz Lenz in 1921 [13]; all authors later became leading
authorities in Nazi eugenics and supported the legalisa-
tion of sterilisation and dismantling of welfare institu-
tions to reinstitute the laws of natural selection [10].
In his essay on the domestication of man, Fischer sug-
gested that domestication should be defined as a condi-
tion in which "the nutrition and reproduction has been
influenced over a number of generations by humans"
(author's translation). In line with these greatly relaxed
definitional criteria of domestication, Fischer reasoned
that humankind should be considered domesticated from
the beginning of its existence. Fischer considered racial
differences to be the result of domestication, because
"almost all characteristics of human races could be found
in domesticated animals, except for the low variability of
the external ear and the lack of dappling of the skin or
hair." Interestingly, Fischer regarded blond hair, blue eyes,
and bright skin colour of Europeans as signs of domesti-
cation-induced partial albinism, as well as, dwarfism and
gigantism in some populations, racial differences con-
cerning the disposition for obesity, temperament, charac-
ter and intelligence. Even "the permanent female breast
indicates domestication much like the udder of domesti-
cated cattle" (author's translation) [12]. However, the
point that "Aryans" should be carriers of outstanding
signs of domestication was apparently overlooked, a
point to which I will return in the discussion. Remarkably,
however, the very same attitude towards domestication
and racial hygiene including support of sterilisation was
also found in leading Jewish scientists such as Richard
Goldschmidt, who was Professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem [14]. Goldschmidt
argued that the abandonment of natural selection and
"radical extermination of the unfit" (Goldschmidt, 1933,
pp. 214; author's translation) ought to be replaced by pos-
itive and negative eugenic measures (apparently, Gold-
schmidt later realised that the Nazi regime held an even
more radical position regarding eugenics and was expatri-
ated by the Nazis in 1935; he was appointed Professor of
Genetics and Cytology at Berkeley, CA). Even anthropolo-
gist Franz Boas, who was not a racist and strongly opposed
the Nazi regime, described curly hair, variation in stature
and increasing or decreasing pigmentation of the skin as
signs of human domestication, but was inconclusive
about how much environmental and genetic factors con-
tributed to these variations [15]. Thus, although Fischer
and colleagues may, to a certain degree, have had an
opportunistic interest in mixing scientific ideas with polit-
ical claims, the association of acknowledging the self-
domestication hypothesis with eugenic consequences
during the 1930s was not only an issue for racist scientists.
In the 1920s, another, entirely independent biological
concept was adopted from embryology to explain human
self-domestication. The Dutch anatomist Louis Bolk
(1926) [16] postulated that adult humans would resem-
ble juvenile apes, and that the retention of juvenile char-
acteristics of the ancestral species into adulthood of the
descendant, referred to as "foetalisation" or "neoteny",
could be associated with the process of domestication. For
example, the zoologist Max Hilzheimer (1926/1927)
argued that "the recent European should be considered
the most progressively domesticated form whereas Nean-
derthals were much less juvenilised" (author's transla-
tion) due to the more pronounced retention of juvenile
traits in anatomically modern humans compared to
Neanderthals (at that time, it was not known that Nean-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:21 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/21
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derthals were not ancestral to anatomically modern
humans) [17]. The parallel drawn between domestication
and neoteny is interesting in light of the currently resur-
rected debate about human self-domestication (see
below).
In the 1940s Nobel laureate Konrad Lorenz' published
some speculations on the relation of human psychologi-
cal capacities to the process of domestication. In his article
Durch Domestikation verursachte Störungen arteigenen Verh-
altens ("Domestication-induced disorders of species-typi-
cal behaviour", published in 1940) Lorenz reiterated
parallels between the living conditions of civilised inhab-
itants of metropolitan areas with domesticated animals,
which he thought indicated signs of degeneration [18].
Lorenz proposed that the intensity and frequency of
instinctual patterns of behaviour were altered under these
conditions, leading to a hypertrophy of some instincts
due to a lowered releasing threshold and to a functional
disruption of species-typical behaviours. Beside the
alleged domestication-associated morphological features
in human beings, such as shortening of the extremities
and of the base of the skull, atony of the muscles, and
obesity, which he later subsumed under the term 'Ver-
hausschweinung' (a term hard to translate that roughly
compares the physical appearance of human beings with
domesticated pigs), Lorenz described a domestication-
associated diminished social sensitivity and a functional
disruption of love, marriage, and the "copulation drive".
Apart from his appallingly coarse language, which con-
formed to the writing style of that time, Lorenz did not
refrain from discussing racial hygienic consequences such
as the "extermination of ethically inferior people." More-
over, and from our perspective today virtually ridiculous,
Lorenz proposed a positive selection for Anständigkeit
(decency) and for the physical ideal of the ancient Greek.
By contrast, in his chapter on Psychologie und Stammesges-
chichte ("psychology and epistemology", first published in
1943) [19] Lorenz took over Arnold Gehlen's idea that
human beings were specialised in being non-specialised.
Gehlen had acknowledged Bolk's and Hilzheimer's
hypotheses as scientific proofs for his thesis of man as
"Mängelwesen" ("deficient being"). Following Gehlen,
Lorenz highlighted man's lack of physiological specialisa-
tion while rejecting the hypothesis of deficiency. In con-
trast to his earlier exclusively negative approval, Lorenz
now accepted the hypothesis of domestication-associated
neoteny, which accounted for the positively asserted
human "Weltoffenheit" ("cosmopolitanism") and persist-
ing explorative behaviour. This was new, since he now
ascribed to neoteny a variety of human behavioural and
psychological features in addition to his physical charac-
teristics. Even in his later writings, however, Lorenz stuck
to his culturally pessimistic attitude, while partially back-
ing off from his writings during the Nazi regime.
Since the 1960s, both the foetalisation and the domestica-
tion hypotheses concerning humans have been refuted by
various scientists. Starck (1962), for example, criticised
that Bolk's hypothesis had been so broadly accepted sim-
ply because the many problems of explaining human evo-
lution could be resolved with apparent ease. According to
Starck, hairlessness and the reduction of pigmentation of
the skin were more reliably explained by chance muta-
tions rather than by foetalisation. Moreover, the retention
of juvenile characters (i.e. neoteny) did not sufficiently
explain the increased variation of traits under domestica-
tion [20]. In addition, Herre and Roehrs (1971) rejected
the human self-domestication hypothesis for its lack of
goal-directedness and artificial selection of traits; nor was
there evidence for a "wild" ancestral human species from
which a domesticated homo sapiens should have derived.
They further argued that a reduction of instinctual pat-
terns of behaviour in human beings could also better be
explained by a more sophisticated cortical control rather
than domestication [21].
As with many scientific ideas, however, the hypothesis of
human self-domestication has recently been revived as a
possible explanation of changes of human physical traits
since the late Pleistocene. These changes include the
reduction of body size and decrease in skeletal robusticity,
modifications in cranial and dental features including
reduction in cranial capacity, shortening of the facial
region of the skull and maleruption of teeth, and reduc-
tion in sexual dimorphism. In contrast to earlier biologi-
cal writings, other domestication-associated features
observed in animals such as an increased variation in skin
colour, increasing fat storage, earlier sexual maturation
and activity, and reduction in motor activity are not dis-
cussed with respect to human self-domestication in recent
accounts [1]. It is indeed plausible to assume that these
changes could have taken place due to the creation of an
artificially protective environment after humans adopted
a more sedentary lifestyle in the Neolithic period, thereby
relaxing natural selection pressures.
Similarly, the idea that foetalisation and domestication
could be related, has recently been highlighted in a semi-
nal paper comparing anatomical features and behaviour
of apes and humans [3]. The authors argue that changes in
social structures of early humans, compared to our closest
living relatives, the chimpanzee, could have favoured the
selection against aggression, and that such selection was
accompanied by a reduction of sexual dimorphism in
humans and the retention of juvenile characteristics in
body shape and behaviour. Interestingly, a parallel devel-
opment has been proposed in the bonobo, which displaysPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:21 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/21
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more neotenic physical features and is much less aggres-
sive compared to the common chimpanzee [3].
From a biological perspective the greatest dispute with
regard to physical changes in anatomically modern
humans akin to domestication pertains to a slight but
measurable decline of brain volume from around 1,400
cm3 to roughly 1,300 cm3, which could be interpreted in
further support of the human self-domestication hypoth-
esis. However, this decline in stature was accompanied by
a reduction in body size such that the allometric brain-
body relation remains unchanged [22]. In contrast to
humans, domesticated animals show a large dispropor-
tionate decline of brain size by up to 30%, especially of
the sensory perceptual centres, compared to their wild
ancestral species, yet no such pronounced decline has
convincingly been demonstrated in any human popula-
tion.
Impact of the human self-domestication 
hypothesis on psychiatry
Quantifying the actual impact of the self-domestication
hypothesis on psychiatry is a difficult endeavour. As psy-
chiatry began to one-sidedly "biologise" mental disorders,
including concepts of aetiology and treatment by the turn
of the 20th century [9], human self-domestication was
readily acknowledged as the primary cause of degenera-
tion, which allegedly had already begun to deteriorate the
genepool of populations or "races". The impact of the self-
domestication hypothesis can perhaps be estimated
according to the influence of prominent psychiatrists on
national and international developments in psychiatry,
who proclaimed the validity of the degeneration para-
digm, and hence, self-domestication. In the first three dec-
ades of the 20th century, German psychiatry had certainly
a leading role worldwide in terms of scientific competence
and recognition. For example, many psychiatrists from
abroad were fellows at the newly founded German Kaiser
Wilhelm Institute for Psychiatry headed by Emil Kraepe-
lin. Kraepelin and his pupil and successor Ernst Rüdin,
who first headed the Genealogical Department of the
Research Institute under Kraepelin's directorship, were
two prominent figures who were ardent advocates of the
degeneration and domestication hypotheses, and both
did not make a secret of their views that domestication
was the main causal factor for the alleged increasing prev-
alence rates of mental disorders and deterioration of the
genepool. In his article Zur Entartungsfrage ("On the ques-
tion of degeneration", 1908) Kraepelin complained about
a steady increase in psychiatric disorders in civilised peo-
ple, while mental disorders remained comparably rare in
"primitive" races [7]. Kraepelin had visited the psychiatric
hospital "Buitenzorg" in Java in 1904 and recognised that
the "paralysis of the insane" and alcoholism were rare
despite a high prevalence of syphilitic infections among
the Java people. This, he reasoned, would indicate a
greater resistance against diseases in these peoples com-
pared to inheritable germ lesions acquired by the forces of
civilisation, which ultimately would lead to an increase of
degeneration insanity ("Entartungsirresein"). (Note that
Kraepelin adhered to the concept of so-called "blast-
ophtoria" (germ lesion), which reflects Lamarckian inher-
itance). Kraepelin now subsumed a variety of "symptoms"
under the domestication paradigm, such as "weakening of
viability and resistance, decreasing fertility (as opposed to
Darwin's observations in domesticated animals), prole-
tarianisation, and moral damage due to 'penning up peo-
ple' (orig. German phrase "Zusammenpferchung")". The
result would be "effeminacy, stunted growth, and debil-
ity" (author's translation). Kraepelin saw further threats in
one-sided "breeding of psychological capacities" in civi-
lised populations, while neglecting physical vigour and
the development of the "free will", all of which for him
was most evident in Jewish people. Kraepelin's language
also reflected the tendency toward brutalisation and radi-
calisation found among many of his contemporaries.
Examples are presented here in some detail (and to my
knowledge for the first time translated into English) to
illustrate the other side of Emil Kraepelin, who is still a
highly regarded icon in psychiatry. Kraepelin was con-
cerned, for example, that "the number of idiots, epileptics,
psychopaths, criminals, prostitutes, and tramps who
descend from alcoholic and syphilitic parents, and who
transfer their inferiority to their offspring, is incalculable.
Of course, the damage will be balanced in part by their
lower viability; however, our highly developed social wel-
fare has the sad side-effect that it operates against the nat-
ural self-cleansing of our people. We may barely hope that
the degeneration-potential will be strong enough in the
long term to eliminate the overflowing sources of germ
lesion. ... Nevertheless, the well-known example of the
Jews, with their strong disposition towards nervous and
mental disorders, teaches us that their extraordinarily
advanced domestication may eventually imprint clear
marks on the race" (author's translation; note that Kraepe-
lin's ideas on domestication were included in the 8th edi-
tion of his "Textbook of Psychiatry", published in 1909)
[23].
Kraepelin's pupil and successor as head of the Kaiser Wil-
helm Institute for Psychiatric Research, Ernst Rüdin, who
later was involved, together with Fischer, Baur, Lenz, and
others, in the introduction of the "law of prevention of
hereditary diseased offspring" ("Gesetz zur Verhinderung
erbkranken Nachwuchses") greatly acknowledged Kraepe-
lin's attitude. In a paper published in 1910 in the Archiv
für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie (Archives of Racial and
Societal Biology), which was one of the leading journals
in the field of genetics and eugenics, and of which Rüdin
was co-editor-in-chief, he reasoned that the medical carePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:21 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/21
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for the insane was a distortion of the natural laws of the
survival of the fittest and that medicine would be obliged
to clean the genetic pool of the Volk in order to prevent
ongoing degeneration [24]. He deplored "alcoholics are
forced to go through a cure in order to extend their lives.
Self-murderers are prevented by force from killing them-
selves. Only the mildly psychotic or psychopathic forms
may die undisturbed ... those who refrain from food
intake are artificially nourished and thus brought over
death, conditions of weakness, and consuming diseases ...
Numerous criminals, who in former times were laid by
the heels or hanged on the spot in the name of justice or
by the self-help of the Volk (best be translated as "people",
however, with a marked nationalist connotation), are
now, if mentally ill, upgraded into the rank of affection-
ately treated sufferers, or, if criminals, simply imprisoned
by virtue of law. Many so-called 'fools' formerly perished
contemptibly. How many had been burned as witches?
Epileptics suffocated or were forever rendered harmless if
dangerous to the community." On the other hand, Rüdin
feared that peoples of high value were "destroyed" as
"cannon fodder in a peaceful cultural war", which led him
to advocate racial hygiene in order to stop ongoing degen-
eration [24].
Kraepelin's and Rüdin's emphasis of degeneration and
domestication as a major explanatory factor for psychiat-
ric disorders is intimately tied to Kraepelin's nosological
system, which was, to a great deal, built on the degenera-
tion paradigm.
Although several aspects of eugenic measures – i.e. sterili-
sation and euthanasia, which drew heavily on the idea
that the general population was threatened by increasing
domestication – were shared by other leading psychia-
trists, the same psychiatrists refuted Kraepelin's one-sided
biological perspective on the aetiology of psychiatric dis-
orders (e.g., [25]), and others explicitly refuted the degen-
eration paradigm for its scientific flaws [26]; (overview in
[9]). Thus, the acknowledgement of the degeneration par-
adigm and its presumed underlying cause (i.e. domestica-
tion), and the support of eugenic measures were, to some
extent, separate issues. Hoche, for example, together with
Karl Binding, who was Professor of Law, authored one of
the most appalling pamphlets entitled "Die Freigabe der
Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens, ihr Maß und ihre
Form" (best be translated as "The approval of the extermi-
nation of valueless lives, its measures and procedures") in
1922, where they outlined euthanasia of mentally handi-
capped individuals [27].
In any event, in light of their outstanding position and
international recognition it can be argued that the impact
of Kraepelin's and Rüdin's opinion can hardly be overes-
timated. Rüdin was highly praised as an internationally
leading authority in psychiatric genetics, and invited to
attend the International Genetic Congress even in sum-
mer 1939. Notably, Rüdin's work on psychiatric genetics
was still cited in a textbook of medical genetics in the early
1970 (quoted from [28]).
After World War II, the self-domestication hypothesis – at
least explicitly – has only patchily been mentioned in the
psychiatric literature. For example, Ernst Kretschmer
(1929) who had pointed to a link between domestication
and breeding of intelligence in his essay on the relation of
genius and psychopathology [29] abandoned these ideas
in later editions [30]. More recently, Richter (1959)
assumed an association between civilisation and domesti-
cation, which, among other diseases, led to an enhanced
vulnerability for mental disorders [31].
Much more popular have been attempts to link psychiat-
ric disorders with the neoteny hypothesis, however, with-
out explicitly referring to domestication. Bemporad
(1991), for instance, assumed that a lack of curiosity in
"dementia praecox" (schizophrenia) might be related to a
dysfunction of regulatory genes controlling neotenic traits
[32].
Crow (1995) proposed a failure of neoteny corresponding
to a lack of cerebral asymmetry in psychotic disorders
[33]. Feierman (1994) speculated on the possible role of
neoteny in the aetiology of schizophrenia, rendering
"nocturnalism" a neotenic trait [34]. Likewise, Jonas and
Jonas (1974) related neurotic patterns of behaviour to
neoteny, assuming that the retention of archaic responses
could reflect preservation of neotenic features [35]. These
ideas have, however, been refuted for their vagueness and
implausibility [36]. Moreover, the neoteny hypotheses
were entirely disentangled from the concept of degenera-
tion, and, beyond doubt, none of the authors has drawn
the slightest moral conclusions from their scientific con-
siderations or confused "is" with "ought".
Discussion
The hypothesis that humans could have undergone ana-
tomical and behavioural changes akin to domestication of
animals by relaxing the forces of natural selection repre-
sents an interesting scientific hypothesis. Even though
there is more evidence against than in favour of human
self-domestication, at least with respect to brain size, early
scientists from Darwin's times on were fascinated with
questions of potential biological consequences of modern
civilisation, i.e. partial abandonment of natural selection,
for physical and mental well-being (here, it may be worth
mentioning that the role of sexual selection has drawn
much less attention with regards to effects of modern liv-
ing-conditions; my personal view is that sexual selection
is at least equally important as natural selection for shap-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:21 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/21
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ing the phenotype of homo sapiens, and that sexual selec-
tion simply cannot be eliminated by "civilisation"). The
hypothesis of human self-domestication may, however,
not only illustrate how the acceptance of scientific con-
cepts wax and wane over time, particularly if definitional
criteria change, as has been the case with domestication;
the main issue here is that scientific hypotheses, particu-
larly if pertaining to human biology, are potentially at risk
of misuse. The self-domestication hypothesis came up at
a time when cultural pessimism and eugenic optimism
prevailed even among scientists [10], and hence, was
approved without further enquiry as a valid explanation
for an even more scientifically vague concept, degenera-
tion. It was probably only a short step to move on from
insufficiently explored scientific ideas to moral claims, a
concept shift commonly referred to as "natural fallacy",
first emphasised by David Hume as early as 1739 [37]. In
the case of self-domestication, the unfortunate connec-
tion between biological science and deduced moral
claims was fuelled by a lack of agreement over the ques-
tion how to deal with naturalistic fallacies, or unwilling-
ness to consider the existence of a naturalistic fallacy for
reasons that may have been associated with political
opportunism or perhaps firm conviction of some leading
scientists in the need for eugenic measures. The atrocities
that followed during the Nazi regime in Germany are
quite well known and summarised elsewhere (e.g.,
[38,39], and shall not be repeated here in detail, but sev-
eral of the inconsistencies of eugenics may be worth a
closer look.
Advocating negative eugenics in order to exterminate or
"weed-out" domestication-induced characteristics had a
long tradition in Europe and North America long before
the Nazis seized power (regarding the eugenics movement
in the United States of America, see for example [40,41]).
On the other hand, much less is known about positive
eugenics, i.e., breeding programmes to improve the
genetic quality of humans, in which undoubtedly racial
selection criteria were applied. By the turn of the penulti-
mate century, Willibald Hentschel, for instance, proposed
the foundation of "Mittgart" in Germany, a rural commu-
nity in which 1000 women and 100 men should mate in
order to renew the "Germanic race" on a polygamous
basis [42,43] (a very recommendable critique can be
found in Oscar Hertwig's essay Zur Abwehr des ethischen,
des sozialen, des politischen Darwinismus, 1918) [44]. More-
over, at the beginning of the 20th century, scientists even
inseminated female chimpanzees with the sperm of black
men in order to breed cheap working slaves. These exper-
iments failed, however, since the inseminated chimpan-
zees died during their transport from Africa to Europe
[45].
During the Nazi regime, human breeding programmes
were put into practice under the leadership of Reichs-
führer-SS Heinrich Himmler. On his behalf, the "Lebens-
born e. V." was founded to breed Aryans according to
anthropological and biometrical criteria such as blond-
ness, blue eyes, form of the skull, etc., but also according
to "mental qualities" [46-48]. All the more grotesquely,
Eugen Fischer (1914) considered blondness and blue eyes
to be domestication-induced variants, and proposed these
for extermination [12].
These inconsistencies notwithstanding, is there anything
to learn from the example of how the hypothesis of
human self-domestication was conceived in the past for
current problems in relation to human biology and soci-
ety? If the misuse of a controversial concept like self-
domestication as scientific underpinning for eugenic
measures can be, in part, attributed to a naturalistic fal-
lacy, may this happen again with regards to modern genet-
ics? What are the limits of gene therapy, specifically from
a psychiatric point of view?
Modern evolutionary biology suggests that physical and
mental characteristics of humans represent biological
adaptations, albeit there may be plenty of trade-offs and
design compromises. We know today that the so-called
"diseases of civilization" are not the result of degeneration
or domestication; rather, many disorders that supposedly
fell into this category result from a mismatch between
adaptation and the modern environment; in other words,
culture and civilisation shape the actual phenotype. For
example, obesity, some subtypes of diabetes mellitus,
hypertension, and coronary heart disease probably
emerge from the selection of so called "thrifty genes",
which were selected because they were once helpful in the
environment of evolutionary adaptedness to maintain the
storage of energy during times of relative food scarcity
[49-55]. Only in modern living conditions with our exces-
sive calorie-intake have these adaptations lost their bene-
ficial effect, at least in Western industrial societies. Thus,
many modern diseases are more environmentally rather
than genetically caused. Moreover, the human genome
comprises much less active genes than originally assumed.
Pleiotropy, a case in which a single gene influences multi-
ple traits, and the interaction of many genes may therefore
be the rule rather than the exception. Thus, it is likely that
gene manipulation would have an incalculable impact on
traits other than the targeted one; such problems have
recently been described in animal experiments, where a
gene passed into a genome of mice unexpectedly induced
leukaemia [56].
In light of these considerations, can we, at all select men-
tal traits for genetic manipulation? Negative eugenics
would imply that distinct predisposing alleles ought to bePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:21 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/21
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eliminated from the gene pool of a population: the genes
in question would perhaps be detectable in pre-implanta-
tion diagnostic screening. Which diseases should be tar-
geted? Perhaps "Alzheimer's disease" (in this case, had the
technology been available, the great philosopher
Immanuel Kant would not have been born) [57]; or
"depression" (we surely would have prevented the birth of
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) [58]; or last but not least
"panic disorder" (in this instance, even Charles Darwin
would perhaps have had fallen prey to negative eugenics)
[59]. On the other hand, the potential targets of positive
eugenics are equally questionable: Would, for instance,
"intelligence" be a valuable trait (in most instances, the
term is understood as technical intelligence)? We may
speculate, however, whether we would have to deal with
an increase of autistic spectrum disorders, since these dis-
orders seem to be more prevalent in families in which the
fathers and grandfathers had been technicians [60].
It is not my intention to demonise gene technology per se,
but it should in the first place be made available to benefit
those thousands of children and adults in the third world
who die from malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious
diseases, which further suggests that gene technology
companies should promote the production of vaccines
and antibiotics. Furthermore, such theoretical models of
human genetic improvement disregard the impact of
environmental factors in shaping the actual phenotype
(note, for example, that many children found in the Nazis'
breeding grounds of the "Lebensborn" after the end of
World War II were developmentally retarded, probably
due to deficient attachment in early childhood) [46].
Conclusion
Man, like all other living beings, is characterised by spe-
cific and unique evolved design compromises, such that
most physical and psychological features have costs and
benefits [61]. Processes akin to the domestication of ani-
mals may, to some degree, have been involved in shaping
human nature, but this assumption depends, above all,
on the definitional criteria of the term "domestication".
We ought to accept our biological heritage and not be
enticed into mistaking biological and technological feasi-
bility for scientific progress. Except for the fact that a
manipulation of the human genome would "benefit"
only a very small minority of the world population, it is in
my opinion more advisable to protect and to recreate
environments worth living in, ones which take into
account our biological predispositions, a claim made very
early by Alfred Russel Wallace, who was a grim opponent
of eugenics [62]. Evolution does not know a higher, or a
better, not even in terms of humankind.
In this article, the process of domestication has served as
an example of how science can be intertwined with philo-
sophical or socio-political issues, known as naturalistic
fallacy. In light of the negative connotation of the term
"domestication", "domestication-like" might be a better
term for human characteristics that resemble domestica-
tion-induced traits in animals. Alternatively, the term
might be replaced by the neutral expression of "adaptive
changes to sedentism". This may, at first sight, be only a
matter of wording and definition, but scientists should be
sensitive that scientific concepts can be associated with
values. Similarly, philosophers should not seek for an "is"
to support their claims for "ought", a problem that may be
referred to as "reversed naturalistic fallacy". Beyond all
discussion of the validity of the self-domestication
hypothesis, the example may support the necessity for an
interdisciplinary exchange of ideas between the life-sci-
ences and philosophy to facilitate an open dialogue.
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